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2Abstract
In the wake of recent food price spikes, plus growing demands for food in emerging Asia and
for biofuels in Europe and the United States, governments are re-examining their strategies
for dealing with both short-term and long-term food security concerns. This paper argues that
long-run trends in real agricultural prices have policy implications for food security that are at
least as important as those related to short-lived spikes around trend prices. The paper
therefore summarizes recent projections of markets to 2030 under various scenarios, and then
reviews evidence on how trade policy restrictions typically are altered to insulate domestic
markets from short-run fluctuations in international prices around their long-run trends. That
provides a firm empirical basis for re-examining the effectiveness and efficiency of various
policy options for ensuring food security in Asia and elsewhere. Those options include
boosting agricultural productivity growth rates to deal with long-run concerns, and using
more-appropriate domestic policy measures rather than trade policies to cope with price
volatility.
Keywords: Food price volatility; long-term food price trends; Asian economic growth and
structural changes; per capita food consumption
JEL codes: F13, F15, F17, Q17, Q18
Author contact details:
Kym Anderson (Corresponding author)
School of Economics
University of Adelaide
Adelaide SA 5005 Australia
Phone +61 8 8303 4712
Fax +61 8 8223 1460
kym.anderson@adelaide.edu.au
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1. Introduction
Between 2004 and 2008, real food prices in international markets rose by 55 percent. They
began to drop back towards trend late in 2008, only to rise steeply again at the end of 2011
along with the prices of energy raw materials, and again in the latter half of 2012. Since Asia
is home to the majority of the world’s poor, and more than 60 percent of the budget of poor
households in Asia is spent on food, this is contributing to inflation in the region and possibly
exacerbating poverty in Asia and elsewhere (ADB 2012a; Ivanic, Martin and Zaman 2012;
Anderson, Ivanic and Martin 2013).
This combination of high and fluctuating food prices understandably raises food
security concerns in developing countries. One consequence has been a call for emergency
physical grain reserves (Fan, Torero and Headey 2011), and discussions among ASEAN + 3
countries have focused on coordinating rice reserves (Briones 2011). Governments in high-
income countries also have expressed concern. Thus another consequence has been that food
price volatility was high on the agenda of the G-8 and G-20 meeting in late 2011 (FAO and
Others 2011) and 2012, and remains there for 2013.
However, the set of factors influencing the trend level of food prices is not the same
as the set affecting the volatility of food prices around that long-run trend. Also, the
distributional and especially poverty effects of fluctuating prices – and of policy responses to
them – differ from those associated with changes in the trend price level. This pair of facts is
2important to recognize because unless societies and governments clarify what concerns them
most, it is not possible to identify the most-appropriate policy actions to ease those concerns.
From the viewpoint of meeting the number one long-run Millennium Development
Goal of permanently eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, the concern over high prices
should dominate concerns over fluctuating prices. Certainly some groups are harmed by
fluctuating food prices, but others can benefit or at least adapt with agility (Barrett and
Bellemare 2011). Even so, governments of low-income countries do worry about sudden
spikes in food prices and are prone to respond in an attempt to reduce the extent of the rise in
the domestic market, but not always in the most-appropriate ways. This paper begins by
focusing on the long-run trend level of food prices, before turning to short-run price
volatility.
During the 20th century real food prices in international markets traced a downward
path (Grilli and Yang 1988, Pfaffenzeller, Newbolt and Rayner 2007), to the point that by the
late 1980s many felt the fear of Malthus was behind us. As a result, growth in funding for
rural development in general and agricultural R&D in particular slowed as development
assistance resources were directed elsewhere (World Bank 2007). Two decades later it is
evident that, as a consequence, productivity growth has slumped – and in both advanced and
developing economies, according to Alston, Babcock and Pardey (2010).1 Meanwhile, rapid
industrial growth in emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere is raising the demand for
imports of primary products, while biofuel subsidies and mandates in numerous countries are
reducing available supplies of food. How will these forces play out in the decades ahead? In
particular, will Asia become more dependent on imported food, and what does that imply
1 Fuglie (2008) provides an alternative set of estimates suggesting it is a slowdown of agricultural investment
rather than productivity growth that is the main cause. This difference in results between the two studies has yet
to be reconciled.
3about its food security as measured by, for example, real per capita food consumption?2 To
address these questions, we summarize a recent set of projections using a model of the world
economy that is projected to 2030 both without and then with some policy changes over that
period. The paper then reviews analyses of the ways in which governments have responded in
the past to year-to-year fluctuations around the trend level of food prices. It reveals that their
trade policy measures seek to insulate domestic food markets from international price
fluctuations to a very considerable degree. Moreover, because governments of both food-
exporting and food-importing countries do this, their combined actions (a) exacerbate
international price fluctuations and thereby (b) offset each other’s efforts to stabilize their
domestic food prices. In the light of those insights into long-term trends and short-term
adjustments to border policy interventions, the final section draws out alternative policy
options for improving food security in Asia.
2. Global long-term core projection to 2030
Asia’s rapid economic growth is shifting the global economic and industrial centre of gravity
away from the north Atlantic, and globalization has led to trade growing faster than output.
Together these forces are raising the importance of Asia’s emerging economies in world
output and trade. They are also shifting the comparative advantages of the more-densely
populated economies of the region away from agriculture, and causing intra-Asian trade to
grow relative to Asia’s trade with the rest of the world.
2 Throughout, we have in mind the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s definition of food security, which
is the state “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and
nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 2003).
More precisely, food security refers to not only availability but also economic access to and effective utilization
of that food (Pinstrup-Andersen 2009, Barrett 2010). Since access to food (and health care) for any poor
household largely depends on its (and perhaps also its extended family’s) income and assets, pro-poor economic
growth is a key to expanding effective per capita food consumption and thereby reducing food insecurity
(Naylor and Dean 2012).
4To examine the extent to which those forces could affect perceived food security (and
so could trigger changes to food price and trade policies), a model of the world economy
needs to be projected forward. This section of the paper summarizes results from work that
builds on the global GTAP modeling of Anderson and Strutt (2012a) which was used to
project South-South trade for ADB (2011b) and whose projections have since been revised
for a study on growth in ASEAN, China and India (Anderson and Strutt 2012b).3
The GTAP 2004 baseline for the world economy is projected forward to provide a
core baseline for 2030 by assuming in the first instance that the 2004 trade-related policies of
each country do not change over that 26-year period, but that national real GDP, population,
unskilled and skilled labor, capital, agricultural land, and extractable mineral resources (oil,
gas, coal and other minerals) grow at the exogenously set rates summarized in Appendix
Table A.1. The exogenous growth rates for GDP, investment and population are based on the
August 2011 projections over the next two decades by ADB. These are supplemented by
World Bank data for real GDP and investment growth for the period to 2010, along with
CEPII data for population growth to 2010 and for national projections of GDP, investment
and population not readily available in the ADB dataset (Fouré et al. 2010). Estimates from
Chappuis and Walmsley (2011) are used for projections of skilled and unskilled labour
growth rates. We estimate historical trends in agricultural land from FAOSTAT (summarized
in Deininger and Byerlee 2011) and in mineral and energy raw material reserves from BP
(2010) and the US Geological Survey (2010).
Given those exogenous growth rates,4 the model is able to derive implied rates of total
factor productivity and GDP per capita growth. For any one country the rate of total factor
productivity growth is assumed to be the same in each of its non-primary sectors, and to be
4 There is much uncertainty in macroeconomic projections over this kind of timeframe (and even the current size
of the Chinese economy is under serious question—see Feenstra et al. 2011). Garnaut (2011) discusses the
uncertain nature of GDP, population and energy projections, and Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2011) examine on
prospects for growth in China in particular.
5somewhat higher in its primary sectors. Higher productivity growth rates for primary
activities were characteristic of the latter half of the 20th century (Martin and Mitra 2001),
and are necessary in this projection if real international prices of primary products (relative to
the aggregate change for all products) are to rise only modestly.5 The international price
consequences for the core simulation are depicted in the first column of Appendix Table
A.2.6
As of 2004, developing countries in Asia were close to self-sufficient in agricultural
and food products as a group, at 96 percent, and that ratio is between 94 and 101 percent for
China, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines (column 1 of Table 1).
The differences across regions in rates of growth of factor endowments and total
factor productivity, and the fact that sectors differ in their relative factor intensities and their
share of GDP and that demands are nonhomothetic, ensure that the structures of production,
consumption and trade across sectors within countries, and also between countries, is going
to be different in 2030 than in 2004. In particular, the faster-growing developing economies
(especially those of Asia) will account for considerably larger shares of the projected global
economy over the next two decades. Their aggregate share of world GDP is projected to rise
from 20 percent in 2004 to 41 percent in 2030, and for just Developing Asia from 11 to 28
percent. Western Europe’s share, meanwhile, is projected to fall from one-third to less than
one-quarter. Population shares change much less, with the developing countries’ share rising
5 We chose that calibration because it is consistent with the World Bank projections over the next four decades
(see van der Mensbrugghe and Roson 2010). An alternative in which agricultural prices fall, as projected in
GTAP-based projection studies in the late 20th century (e.g., Anderson et al. 1997), is considered unlikely over
the next two decades given the slowdown in agricultural R&D investment since 1990 and its consequent
delayed slowing of farm productivity growth (Alston, Babcock and Pardey 2010). It is even less likely for farm
products if fossil fuel prices and biofuel mandates in the US, EU and elsewhere are maintained over the next
decade. Timilsina et al. (2010) project that by 2020 international prices will be higher in the presence vs the
absence of those biofuel mandates for sugar (10 percent), corn (4 percent), oilseeds (3 percent), and wheat and
coarse grains (2.2 percent), while petroleum product prices will be 1.4 percent lower.
6 The extent to which productivity growth rates are higher in each primary sector than in other sectors is the
same for high-income and developing countries, and is the same for all crop and livestock industries within each
country’s farm sector. Since overall TFP growth is higher for developing than high-income, this means we are
assuming agricultural TFP growth is higher for developing than high-income countries on average (consistent
with the estimate by Ludena et al. (2007, Table 2) that agricultural TFP annual growth during 1981-2000
averaged 1.3 percent globally and only 0.9 percent for high-income countries).
6from 80 to 83 percent but Developing Asia’s component falling a little, from 55 to 53 percent
between 2004 and 2030. Thus per capita incomes converge considerably, with the ratio of the
high-income to developing country average more than halving, from 16 to 7 between 2004
and 2030. In particular, the per capita income of Developing Asia is projected to rise from 20
to 53 percent of the global average over the projection period (Appendix Table A.3).
When global value added is broken down by sector, the changes are more striking.
This is especially so for China: by 2030 its relatively very rapid economic growth is projected
to return it to its supremacy as the world’s top producing country not only of primary
products but also of manufactures – a ranking China has not held since the mid-19th century
when first the UK and then (from 1895) the US became the top-ranked country for industrial
production (Allen 2011, Figure 2).
The developing country share of global exports of all products is projected to increase
by half, rising from one-third in 2004 to 57 percent by 2030. China’s share alone trebles to 18
percent, at the expense of high-income countries. The group’s import share also rises,
although not quite so dramatically: the increase for Developing Asia is from 18 to 34 percent
(Tables 4 and 5 of Anderson and Strutt 2012b).
The developing country share of global exports of agricultural and food products is
projected to remain virtually unchanged, while their share of global imports of farm products
rises considerably. Hence its self-sufficiency in farm products is lower in this core scenario
for 2030 than in 2004, dropping from 96 to 87 percent in the case of Developing Asia. The
source of that change is mainly China but also some countries in Southeast Asia and also
Pakistan (columns 1 and 2 of Table 1).
Continuing Asian industrialization causes primary products to become less important
in developing country exports and considerably more important in their imports, and
conversely for non-primary products, with the changes being largest in Developing Asia. The
7opposite is true for high-income countries, which may seem surprising but recall that what
one part of the world imports the remaining part of the world must export to maintain global
equilibrium.7 Services exports, however, are far more important for India than for China or
the large ASEAN countries in 2004, and that difference is projected to increase substantially
by 2030 (Anderson and Strutt 2012b, Tables 3 to 5).
For China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Vietnam the projected
economic growth to 2030 leads to a substantial decline in their projected agricultural self-
sufficiency, spread over most farm product groups, while for India and Bangladesh the
changes are much smaller. The consequent increase in Developing Asia’s share of global
imports of agricultural and food is from 14 to 41 percent, while its change in the share of
world exports is only from 13.9 to 14.7 percent (Anderson and Strutt 2012b, Table 6).
National self sufficiency is a poor indicator of food security, however (Pinstrup-
Andersen 2009, Barrett 2010, Warr 2011). A more meaningful indicator is the change in real
per capita household consumption of agricultural and processed food products. The first
column of Table 3 shows that, for Developing Asia, the volume consumed per capita in the
core 2030 scenario would be 1.4 times that in 2004. The increase is even larger for China,
India, Pakistan, Philippines and Vietnam, while somewhat smaller for other Asian countries.
That clearly represents a huge improvement in food security. But how sensitive is that
number to the model’s assumptions about farm productivity growth?
2.2 Sensitivity of 2030 projections to primary sector productivity assumptions
7 As can be inferred from the first two columns of Table 1, some of the increased imports of farm products by
developing countries would come from Australasia, Western Europe and North America (where food
consumption is increasing only very slowly compared with farm output growth). Further disaggregation of the
results reveals that some of those imports would come also from such large food-exporting developing countries
as Brazil and South Africa, both of whose self sufficiency rises by around one-fifth.
8The above core projection is compared in this sub-section with two contrasting alternative
growth scenarios:
 Slower total factor productivity (TFP) growth in primary sectors in all countries; and
 Faster total factor productivity (TFP) growth in grain cropping in Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries, China and India (hereafter
abbreviated to ACI).
The first of these alternative scenarios involves dropping the assumption that
productivity growth in the primary sectors increases to nearly match the growing global
demand for such products. Compared with the core projection, which is consistent with the
evidence presented by Fuglie (2008), this is a plausible alternative that is more consistent
with the evidence of the past two decades provided by Alston, Babcock and Pardey (2010) of
a slowdown in productivity growth in agriculture in both high-income and developing
countries. In this alternative case, real international prices for agricultural, mineral and energy
raw material products by 2030 are much more above 2004 levels than in the core projection.
This is achieved by lowering the additional TFP growth rate for forestry and fishing by 1.5
percentage point and for mining, agriculture and lightly processed food by one percentage
point. These amendments lead to real international prices for farm products in 2030 to be 25
instead of just 9 percent above those in 2004, and those for other primary products to be 101
instead of 25 percent above 2004 levels (see Appendix Table A.2 for details by product).
Those increases are consistent with the price projections of several international agencies
(FAO/OECD 2010, Nelson et al. 2010, IEA 2010).
The higher prices more than compensate for lower farming and mining productivity
such that the share of primary products in GDP is slightly higher in this scenario than in the
core projection. This does not lead to developing countries being more food self-sufficient
though (Table 1), nor to much change in their share of global trade in farm products
9(Anderson and Strutt 2012b, Tables 4 and 5). This is because the slower farm productivity
growth is assumed to apply to all countries, so they tend to adjust in unison. However, it does
lead to much lower increases in real household food consumption per capita, particularly in
developing countries (compare columns 1 and 2 of Table 3).
By contrast with the above alternative, the second alternative scenario presumes there
is increased investment in the production of new or adaption of imported crop technologies so
as to ensure grain output is higher for ASEAN countries, China and India than in the core
scenario.8 In this alternative scenario the TFP growth rates for rice, wheat and coarse grains
are set an extra one percentage point higher for just those key Asian developing countries.
This raises overall agricultural self-sufficiency rates of those countries by between 1 and 3
percentage points, but lowers them slightly for other Asian countries (Table 1). More
importantly, it raises -- by several percentage points -- self-sufficiency in the staple grain
crops of China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and India (compare parts (b) and
(c) of Table 2).
This positive shock to grain productivity – even though it is confined just to ASEAN,
China and India – has a noticeable impact on the projected real international prices of grains.
Instead of rice, wheat and coarse grain prices rising between 2004 and 2030 by 10, 15 and 22
percent, as in the core simulation, they rise in this alternative scenario by only 4, 12 and 18
percent, respectively (compare columns 1 and 3 of Appendix Table A.2). This means that
even though the demand for livestock products expands because of higher incomes in those
more-productive countries, the international prices of meat and milk do not rise, because
animal feed prices are lower. Hence grain self-sufficiency and real household food
8 This might come about through, for example, greater recognition on the part of government leaders in those
countries of the extremely high marginal social rate of return from further agricultural R&D in developing
countries (Alston, Beddow and Pardey 2009). Indeed Asian countries, especially China, have been investing far
more in agricultural R&D per dollar of output than other countries in the past two decades (Pardey, Alston and
Kang 2012). Recent revisions of marginal rates of return suggest earlier numbers were exaggerated, but even the
latest estimates suggest very high benefit/cost ratios (Alston et al. 2011, Rao, Hurley and Pardey 2012).
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consumption per capita in developing Asia – and hence likely perceptions of regional food
security – are slightly higher in this than in the core scenario for 2030 (compare columns 1
and 3 of Table 3).
3. Alternative policies by 2030
The above projections all assume trade policies remain unchanged between the base period
and 2030. This section examines how the above core scenario for 2030 would be altered if
some trade policy reforms were to be undertaken over the projection period. Three trade
liberalization scenarios are compared with the 2030 core baseline. They are then contrasted
with an agricultural protection scenario, in which it is assumed a strong agreement is not
reached under the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda and as a consequence developing
countries follow the prior example of earlier-industrializing countries in Europe and
Northeast Asia and allow tariffs on imports of farm products to increase as their incomes and
agricultural comparative disadvantages rise.
3.1 Regional and global trade liberalization options
The first two trade reform possibilities considered assume membership of the ASEAN free
trade area is extended to six additional countries (China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia
and New Zealand) to form ASEAN+6. The first of them assumes all merchandise trade is
freed on a preferential basis within the expanded ASEAN+6 bloc, while the second of them
assumes all merchandise trade is freed by all countries in the expanded ASEAN+6 group not
on a preferential basis but rather also with the rest of the world (that is, on a most-favored-
nation or MFN basis).
11
If the ASEAN+6 initiative was purely preferential, the global gains by 2030 would
$60 billion per year but most of those gains would be enjoyed in East Asia and Australia/New
Zealand, and non-Asian developing countries as a group would be slightly worse off. In that
scenario, ASEAN agricultural output would be one-sixth higher because the more-densely
populated countries in South and East Asia would specialize more in non-farm products and
import more agricultural goods from ASEAN. Were those trade policy reforms by ASEAN+6
to be on an MFN basis (that is, if tariffs were removed for trade not only within the group but
also with non-members), the global gains would nearly treble, to $166 billion per year by
2030, of which Developing Asia’s share would be $52 billion. In that case non-Asian
developing countries would gain around $30 billion, and they would compete with
ASEAN+6 exporters of farm products in supplying even more agricultural goods to Japan,
China and India.9
The impact of expanding the ASEAN bloc by 6 members and freeing trade among the
expanded membership causes ASEAN’s agricultural exports to increase considerably. With
China and India, their share of world agricultural exports (imports) in 2030 then would be 15
instead of 12 percent (39 instead of 34 percent) – even though agricultural self-sufficiency of
China, India and ASEAN would not change by more than 1 or 2 percentage points (Table 1).
Accompanying that liberalization would be an expansion in per capita food
consumption. This is not surprising, because agricultural trade reform typically lowers food
prices in protective import-dependent countries, raises international food prices and hence the
earnings of food producers in other countries, and increases economic welfare in the world as
a whole. The extent of the improvement in real per capita household consumption of
9 Those welfare benefits are nearly half what they would be if all countries of the world were to remove their
barriers to goods trade. Such an extreme reform would generate estimated welfare gains of $384 billion per year
globally by 2030, made up of $150 billion for high-income countries, $134 billion for Developing Asia, and
$101 billion for other developing countries (Anderson and Strutt 2012b, Table 16).
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agricultural and food products in Developing Asian countries is estimated here to be 1-2
percent (Table 4).10
3.2 The agricultural protection option
Historically, the trend level of national nominal rates of assistance to agriculture11 have
tended to be higher, the higher a country’s income per capita and the weaker a country’s
agricultural comparative advantage (Anderson 2009a, Ch. 1). Thus when mapped over time,
the agricultural NRA has been gradually rising for developing countries as a group, and also
for high-income countries prior to the 1990s. If past policy trends were to continue for
today’s developing countries, then in the absence of a strong Doha agreement to lower WTO-
bound tariffs on imports of farm products their NRA may keep increasing above zero. That is
certainly what Korea and Taiwan did in following Japan, and China, India and ASEAN
appear to be on a similar trajectory (Anderson 2009b).12
Drawing on political economy theory and past experience, Anderson and Nelgen
(2011) examine econometrically whether agricultural protection increases with per capita
income and agricultural comparative disadvantage, and tends to be higher for import-
competing than exported products. They estimate a relationship for ten key traded farm
products as of 2004, and project NRAs for each of those products to 2030 for each
developing country in the World Bank distortion database compiled by Anderson and
10 Those are very much lower-bound estimates, not only because the comparative static GTAP model does not
include services policy reform but also because it excludes the dynamic gains from trade liberalization. Rcent
reviews by Tarr (2012a,b) suggest the consumption gains could be several times larger if a more-comprehensive
model were to be available.
11 The nominal rates of assistance to agriculture (NRA) is defined as the percentage by which government
policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the government’s intervention
(or lowered them, if NRA<0). See Anderson et al. (2008).
12 Such a trend is already evident for China: its agricultural NRA rose from -3 to 21 percent between 1999 and
2010 (Anderson and Nelgen 2013). This has been sufficient to maintain self sufficiency in all key farm products
except soybean (whose tariff is bound in the WTO at 3 percent and which mostly goes into livestock feed and so
helps maintain apparent self sufficiency in meat and milk). In India, its agricultural NRA rose from 8 to 25
percent between 1999 and 2006, before dropping back as export restrictions were introduced to reduce the rise
in domestic food prices (Anderson and Nelgen 2013). In Indonesia, its agricultural NRA rose from -3 to 27
percent between 1999 and 2010 (Anderson and Nelgen 2013), and in November 2012 a new Food Law was
introduced in Indonesia to make food self-sufficiency an even stronger policy goal.
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Valenzuela (2008).13 They assume all developing countries respect their current commitment
to WTO not to exceed their tariff bindings but otherwise feel free to allow domestic political
forces to determine the degree of protection provided to import-competing farm industries.
They use those criteria to obtain projected values for each of the ten products and for each of
the 39 developing countries in the World Bank sample. For developing countries as a whole,
the average NRA for these products is projected to rise from 7 percent in 2004 to 35 percent
by 2030, while for Developing Asia the average rises from 11 to 42 percent.
To see what those projected NRAs imply about the cost of agricultural and other
price- and trade-distorting policies in the world economy in 2030, compared with assuming
no changes in trade policies since 2004, the above results from the full global trade
liberalization are compared with those generated by assuming such farm protection growth.
The results suggest Asian developing countries would become only slightly more
agriculturally self-sufficient in 2030 (Table 1, and parts (b) and (d) of Table 2), while their
real food consumption would grow slightly less in this agricultural protection growth scenario
than in the core scenario (compare columns 1 and 4 in Table 3). Full trade liberalization by
2030 from that counterfactual situation of increased agricultural protection would thus raise
real food consumption per capita non-trivially (final column of Table 4).
4. Trade policy responses to short-term food security concerns with volatile prices
Both politicians and vulnerable households worry about short-term fluctuations around long-
run trends in markets for staple foods. Fluctuations are to be expected in commodity markets
13 Their findings are as expected from political economy theory and past experience, so they use them to project
NRAs for 2030. The projected NRAs are then subjected to the following two tests for each developing country.
First, if a product was in 2004 and is projected to still be a net export product for a country in 2030, then its
2030 NRA is assumed to be the lesser of its 2004 NRA or zero. That is, it is assumed all export taxes will be
phased out by 2030, and that no new export subsidies will be introduced. And second, if the product is projected
to be an import-competing product in 2030, then its 2030 NRA is assumed to be the lesser of the equation’s
projected NRA or the country’s WTO-bound tariff rate.
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subject to periodic supply or demand shocks, especially if adverse supply shocks occur when
stocks are at low levels (Wright 2011; Carter, Rausser and Smith 2011). They are even more
likely in the presence also of sporadic and unpredictable changes in government storage
activity, which end to crowd out stabilizing investments in grain storage by private firms.
Many governments seek to shield their domestic markets somewhat from those fluctuations,
and especially from severe spikes in international prices of staple foods. Not surprisingly,
then, variations in domestic prices often are less than variations in world prices. The extent to
which world prices transmit to national markets depends on trade policies, domestic price
subsidies or taxes, market integration, infrastructure affecting trade costs, and domestic
market imperfections.
Typically governments insulate their domestic markets by altering the restrictiveness
of their trade policies, on both imports and exports.14 An export tax or its equivalent lowers
the domestic price below the border price of a tradable product such as grain (as does an
import subsidy), whereas an import tax or its equivalent raises its domestic price above the
border price (as does an export subsidy). Hence it is not surprising that governments, in
seeking to protect domestic consumers from an upward spike in international food prices,
consider a change in trade measures as an appropriate response, since that can lower the
consumer tax equivalent of any such measure. However, an import tax (or export subsidy) is
the equivalent of a consumer tax and a producer subsidy, hence lowering it also reduces the
extent to which the measure assists producers of the product in question.
Likewise, since an export tax (or import subsidy) is the equivalent of a consumer
subsidy and a producer tax, raising it not only helps consumers but also harms farmers. If
farming is discouraged, the demand for labor on farms falls, and with it the wages of
unskilled workers not only in farm jobs but also in non-farm jobs – and more so the poorer
14 For reviews of recent examples of such interventions, see Jones and Kwiecinski (2010), ADB (2012a), and
FAO and Others (2011).
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and more agrarian is the economy. Thus while poor households may benefit on the
expenditure side from a measure that reduces the extent to which the price of food would
otherwise rise, they could be harmed on the earnings side if they are sellers of food or
suppliers of unskilled labor. Such trade policy responses therefore could add to rather than
reduce poverty.15 In the case of small intervening countries unable to influence their terms of
trade, such trade measures also are likely to reduce their national economic welfare, because
they distort domestic production in addition to lowering the consumer price of food.16 They
are also wasteful if it is only the poorest consumers who need to be helped, since a trade
measure affects all food consumers in the country and in proportion to their level of
consumption.17
Moreover, trade measures are not only inequitable, and inefficient at protecting a
needy group from being harmed by a temporary shock to international food markets, but they
are also ineffective if food-exporting and food-importing countries respond by altering their
trade barriers in an effort to prevent the transmission of the international price shock. If only
food-exporting countries respond to an upward price spike, the international terms of trade
would turn even further in their favor because of the additional reduction in available supplies
on the international markets (and conversely if only food-importing countries alter their trade
restrictions when the world price of food collapses). Such action would thus add both to the
15 Recent empirical studies report numerous cases where trade restrictions have added to or would add to
poverty. See, for example, Warr (2005), Hertel and Winters (2006), and Anderson, Cockburn and Martin
(2011). The more poor households are net buyers of staple foods, however, the more a grain price spike is likely
to add to poverty (Anderson, Ivanic and Martin 2013).
16 Variable trade restrictions can also affect long-term investments and hence economic growth rates. Drawing
on a broad range of developing country case studies, Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1990) and Collier, Gunning
and Associates (1999) suggest that faster economic growth would result from allowing producers access to high
prices in those rare occasions when they spike, rather than taxing it away. According to the evidence in their
case studies, this is because governments are more prone than farm households to squander the windfall either in
poor public investments or in extra consumption. An alternative view is that there are high costs of domestic
price variability that reduce economic growth. See, e.g., Williamson (2012) on commodity terms of trade
volatility generally and Myers (2006) more specifically on food prices.
17 Conversely, in the case of opposite changes to trade measures aimed at protecting farmers from a spike
downwards in international prices, it is consumers who are inadvertently harmed by such trade policy responses,
and all surplus producers are helped – and in proportion to their marketed output – rather than just the poorest,
thereby adding to farm income inequality.
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extent of the international price spike and to the transfer of welfare from food-deficit to food-
surplus countries (or from food-surplus to food-deficit countries when the price spike is
downward and only food-deficit countries respond).
However, when both sets of countries seek to insulate their domestic markets from an
external shock, their impacts on the international price spike are reinforcing but their impacts
on the volume they trade internationally – and hence on their domestic prices – are offsetting.
Indeed if food-deficit countries shift to the right their demand curve for imports to exactly the
same extent as food-surplus countries shift to the left their export supply curve, the domestic
price in both sets of countries would be no different than if neither country altered their trade
measures following the exogenous shock. That is, in that case the full extent of the
international price change from the initial shock would be transmitted to both sets of
countries, despite their efforts to insulate their domestic markets.
Furthermore, the more countries that participate and thus the more the international
price spike is accentuated, the more compelled will other countries feel to join the
bandwagon, which pushes that international price even higher. This is a classic collective-
action problem akin to when a crowd stands up in a stadium to get a better view: on average
no one gets a better view by standing, but those that remain seated get a worse view and so
are induced to stand as well. Clearly there is a case for multilateral agreement to desist from
using trade measures for this purpose.
Governments do not limit their interventions in markets for farm products to periods
of extreme prices of course. Around the long-run trends in agricultural NRAs for each
country there is much fluctuation from year to year in individual product NRAs.18 NRAs are
18 A change in NRA may not require any policy action on the part of the government, but rather be part of the
original policy design. For example, the use of specific rather than ad valorem rates of trade taxation or trade
subsidization automatically ensures some insulation of the domestic market from international price changes, as
does the use of quantitative restrictions on trade such as fixed import or export quotas or bans. Explicit formulae
for varying the import or export duty according to international price movements also may be part of the policy
regime. And in some cases explicit provisions for restricting or relaxing trade barriers in price spike periods also
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negatively correlated with deviations from trend in the international price of the product in
question, and especially for rice and wheat (Figure 1). To examine how much that behavior
varies across products, Table 5 provides new estimates of the elasticity of transmission of the
international product price to the domestic market for key crop products in Asian developing
economies. Following Nerlove (1972) and Tyers and Anderson (1992, pp. 65-75), they are
based on a partial-adjustment geometric distributed lag formulation to estimate elasticities for
the period 1985 to 2010. The unweighted averages across that sample of those short-run
elasticities range from a low of 0.4 for sugar to a bit over 0.5 for rice and wheat and 0.7 for
soybean. Anderson and Nelgen (2012) repeat this exercise for 82 countries and the ten most
important farm products, and get an unweighted average of 0.56. Together this suggests that
within one year, barely half the movement in international prices of key farm products is
transmitted domestically. While some of that may be due to the nature of trade costs, much of
it is the result of governments varying their country’s trade restrictions.
How successfully have such variations in trade restrictions reduced instability in
domestic relative to international markets for farm products? A statistical indicator that can
help answer this question is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the
sample mean) of the domestic producer price relative to that for the corresponding border
price.19 Table 6 provides estimates of that relative indicator for key farm products in various
Asian countries, for the period 1985-2010. The averages across countries of those estimates
suggest that interventions in Developing Asia were severe enough to provide some insulation
are part of a policy’s legislation – even though the use of that provision may lay dormant in all but extreme
periods. In what follows such possibilities will be treated no differently than any formal change of policy: both
show up as a change in the NRA.
19 Both prices are deflated by the United States’ GDP deflator and deviations are measured around log-linear
trends and expressed as a percentage.
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for rice and sugar, but to have had little impact in preventing domestic market prices from
gyrating less than prices in international markets for the other products shown.20
As mentioned above, such a modest outcome is possible when food-exporting and
food-importing countries both alter their trade restrictions in offsetting ways when
international prices move away from trend. Indeed the indicator in Table 6 overstates the
degree of success of national governments in stabilizing domestic prices, because without
such policy actions the international price fluctuations would have been smaller. Martin and
Anderson (2012) suggest a method to estimate by how much smaller. While their method
relies on a number of simplifying assumptions,21 it at least provides an indication of the
combined influence of such variations in trade restrictions on each product market. Applying
that method to data for the 1972-74 and 2006-08 grain price spikes yields the results shown in
Tables 7 and 8.
The first column of Table 7 suggests that in both periods between one-sixth and one-
tenth of the maize price rise, between one-fifth and one-quarter of the wheat price rise, and
more than one-quarter of the rice spike in those two periods can be attributed to variations in
trade restrictions. Furthermore, the right-hand columns show how much of those impacts
came from exporting as distinct from importing countries: when averaged across the three
grains, the contribution of exporting countries is only slightly greater than that of importing
countries.
The proportional contribution of both sets of countries’ governments, shown in
column 1 of Table 7, can be used to discount the rise in the international prices of those
20 This is consistent with a stochastic dynamic simulation exercise for India’s grain markets which showed that
unilateral liberalization of trade could lead to greater domestic price stability even though it would make world
prices more volatile (Srinivasan and Jha 2001). It is also consistent with the findings of a more-recent study that
assessed the contributions that parastatals have made to food security in the six most populous economies of
South and Southeast Asia, which found them wanting (Shahidur, Gulati and Cummings 2008).
21 It assumes that output cannot respond in the short run, that inventory levels are so low that stock adjustments
have limited effect (as is typically the case in a price spike period – see Wright 2011), and that the national
elasticities of final demand for the product in question are the same across countries. It also ignores cross-
elasticities between products.
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grains to suggest how much those prices would have risen if governments had not altered
their trade restrictions. That can be seen in column 2 of Table 8. Column 3 gives the
unweighted average across all countries in our sample of the domestic price rises for those
grains. The numbers for 2006-08 suggest that, on average, domestic prices rose slightly more
than the adjusted international price change for wheat, while they rose almost as much for
maize and only one-sixth less for rice. The extent of insulation was somewhat greater in
developing countries. This recent experience contrasts with the early 1970s, when high-
income countries were much more insulated than recently, and also compared with
developing countries in the 1970s (see upper half of Table 8). These results provide further
evidence that the combined responses by governments of all countries have been sufficiently
offsetting as to do very little to insulate domestic markets from this recent international food
price spike.
This evidence that even the substantial variations in border trade restrictions practiced
in the past have been ineffective in reducing domestic food price fluctuations is of concern
for Asia’s developing countries not only from a food security viewpoint but also from an
inflation viewpoint (ADB 2012a). This is because, leaving aside Japan, Korea and Taiwan,
food has a weight of between 30 and 60 percent in the Consumer Price Index of developing
Asian countries. It has an even higher weight in the consumption basket of poor households
within those countries (Deaton and Dupriez 2011).
5. Policy options and implications
Given the above findings on long-run trends and short-term market fluctuations in global
food markets, and past government responses to and influences on both, it is now possible to
examine in a more-informed way the options available to national governments – unilaterally,
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plurilaterally and multilaterally – for dealing with food security issues in the years ahead.
Asia’s two largest developing countries, China and India, have a particularly large stake in
this issue, because of their declining food self sufficiency (Table 1) and their rising shares of
global grain consumption – which is projected to increase from 25 to 40 percent between
2004 and 2030 (Table 9).
The trade policy scenarios analyzed above suggest that agricultural protection growth
is not a long-run solution to boosting food security, in the sense of raising per capita food
consumption. On the contrary, it raises the price of food in protecting countries, and it lowers
overall national economic welfare in both protecting and food-exporting countries. More
specifically, import-restricting food policies reduce the food security of all households that
are net buyers of food, including those farm households specializing in producing products
other than food staples. In countries where such households account for the majority of the
poor, such import restrictions add to poverty (Ivanic and Martin 2010). Thus governments of
countries experiencing a long-run decline in food self-sufficiency need to resist the
temptation to go down the agricultural protection growth path, and instead consider other
options for ensuring their national long-run food security.
As for short-run food security concerns, fluctuations in national trade barriers are not
a very effective way of dealing with international price spikes, because when a similar
proportion of food-exporting and food-importing countries so act, they tend to neutralize each
other’s domestic market stabilizing efforts and at the same time accentuate the international
price spike and so push more countries into acting similarly. The evidence summarized above
suggests there is a strong case for multilateral agreement to desist from using trade measures
for this purpose. The case for countries to get together to agree not to alter their border
measures in response to price fluctuations is especially strong in situations where only a few
countries account for most of the world’s production and consumption. Since a dozen Asian
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countries account for all but one-tenth of the global rice market, it should be relatively easy
for the region’s governments to cooperate in this way to reduce short-run rice security
concerns. Even if they differ in their desired national long-term trend levels of rice protection,
they could at least reduce fluctuations in the international price of rice by agreeing to use
fixed ad valorem tariffs rather than variable or volumetric import taxes or quantitative trade
restrictions.
Another long-run option for Asian countries is to liberalize their trade, which is
shown above to be able to boost per capita food consumption. The extent of those benefits is
likely to be greater the more encompassing is any such liberalization.
Turning to domestic measures, possibly the best long-term option for many
developing countries is investing more in agricultural R&D. The above results show that this
has the potential to boost per capita food consumption in both food-exporting and food-
importing countries. If there are high marginal social rates of return from such investments,
then they will also boost economic growth. Provided the resulting supply expansion does not
depress world food prices too much, it could also boost the incomes of farmers. For both
reasons, this option is likely also to be poverty alleviating over the longer term (Ivanic and
Martin 2010). So too would be improvements in the formal credit market, since it is the asset-
and income-poor who are usually the least able to access credit at reasonable (let alone
subsidized) interest rates to tide them over short-term periods of hardship. The development
of markets for commodity futures, weather-index insurance and currency hedging offers
financial mechanisms for helping traders deal with risk and uncertainty, and ones that are
becoming gradually more accessible in many developing country settings (Byerlee, Jayne and
Myers 2006; OECD 2009; FAO and Others 2011).
In the past three years there has been a range of other domestic measures adopted by
various Asian developing countries to deal with short-term concerns associated with a food
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price spike (see Jones and Kwiecinski 2010; Tangermann 2011). Two are mentioned by way
of conclusion: altering grain stocks, and conditional/targeted cash transfers.
Government involvement in grain stockholding appeals to many as a sensible food
security strategy. However, their involvement in the market for storage services can crowd
out private stockholding. This is because usually it adds to market uncertainty, since
predicting the sporadic and often politically-driven purchase and selling decisions of a para-
statal agency is typically very difficult. This is again a collective action problem: if all
governments agreed not to engage in large-scale grain storage, there would be no need for
any government to do so because the private sector would then find it profitable to purchase
and store when prices were low (thereby putting a floor under farmer prices), and to sell from
those stockholdings when prices are high (Wright 2011). If governments are still fearful that
a widespread crop failure may deplete those stocks, they may be tempted to get together and
contribute to a transparent joint stockholding program with firmly agreed rules for sharing
accurate information on stocks held and for buying and selling. Past experience cautions
against such action, however, because previous international commodity agreements have led
at best to disappointing outcomes (Gilbert 2010). Recent analysis also cautions against
regional reserves. Larson et al. (2012), for example, stochastically model the wheat markets
of the Middle East and North Africa, and show that a much cheaper option than a regional
reserve is targeted consumer subsidies in times of price spikes. It remains to be seen as to
whether the ASEAN plan to establish a regional rice reserve will fare better than past efforts
with grain reserve schemes.
Potentially, schemes that target only those in most need are far more efficient than
administered pricing schemes and trade policies that affect all producers and consumers. In
the case of upward spikes in staple food prices, the distribution of coupons for the poor is one
example of such a targeted scheme. In the past the transactions cost of making such transfers
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to poor households was prohibitively expensive but, thanks to the information technology
revolution, it is now possible for developing country governments to provide conditional cash
transfers electronically at relatively little cost (see, for example, Adato and Hoddinott 2010).
In summary, governments can play a useful role in enhancing food security in both
the short run and long run, but the societal payoffs will be greatest if their activities are
focused on improving the efficiency of their domestic markets (e.g. for smallholder credit),
overcoming externalities (such as the free-rider problem that leads to under-investment in
agricultural R&D), improving rural transport and communication infrastructure (to lower the
gap between producer and wholesale prices), and coordinating with other governments to
multilaterally dismantle market-distorting price and trade policies (so many of which increase
the volatility of international food prices and reduce per capita food consumption).
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Figure 1: Rice and wheat NRAs and their international price, 82 countries,a 1970 to 2010
(left axis is international price in current US$, right axis is weighted average NRA in percent)
(a) Rice
(b) Wheat
Source: Based on the update of NRA estimates in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) by
Anderson and Nelgen (2013).
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Table 1: Agricultural self-sufficiency ratio,a 2004 base, 2030 core and 2030
alternative growth scenarios, and trade reform scenarios
(percent)
Baseline scenarios Trade reform scenarios
2004 2030
core
2030
Slower
prim
TFP
2030
Faster
ACI
grain
TFP
Incr.
agric
prot’n
ASEAN
+6, pref.
ASEAN
+6, MFN
Full lib’n
from
higher
ag prot
WEurope 0.94 1.05 1.01 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.01
Russia 0.88 0.87 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.75
RestEEurope 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.02 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.05
USA 1.04 1.19 1.18 1.18 1.16 1.18 1.22 1.22
Canada 1.09 1.27 1.24 1.27 1.24 1.26 1.30 1.33
Australia 1.39 1.55 1.42 1.53 1.45 1.73 1.57 1.63
NewZealand 1.62 1.90 1.97 1.89 1.88 2.08 1.98 2.03
Japan 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.75 0.65 0.65
China 0.97 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.79
Singapore 0.40 0.61 0.72 0.59 0.52 0.78 0.76 0.91
Indonesia 0.95 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.82
Malaysia 0.61 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45
Philippines 0.94 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.85 0.76 0.72 0.72
Thailand 1.13 1.02 1.03 1.04 0.98 1.08 1.08 1.08
Vietnam 1.15 1.06 1.01 1.06 1.04 1.22 1.21 1.20
RestSEAsia 1.02 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94
PacificIslan 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.92 2.05
HongKong 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36
SouthKorea 0.82 0.84 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.93 0.90 0.88
Taiwan 0.78 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.75
RestNEAsia 0.83 0.73 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.71
India 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.00
Pakistan 0.98 0.84 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84
Bangladesh 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.87
RestSthAsia 0.96 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.87
CentralAsia 1.04 1.09 1.05 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.10
Latin America 1.10 1.23 1.29 1.22 1.20 1.23 1.26 1.40
M.E. & Africa 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91
High-income 0.97 1.09 1.06 1.09 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.09
Developing 0.98 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.93
of which Asia: 0.96 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.85
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
aAgricultural self-sufficiency ratio excludes ‘other (processed) food products’.
Source: From GTAP Model results summarized in Anderson and Strutt (2012b).
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Table 2: Self-sufficiency ratio for various agricultural products, 2004 base, 2030 core, and
2030 under alternative TFP growth and farm trade policy scenarios
(a) 2004 base
Rice Wheat Coarse
Grains
Oilseeds Sugar Cotton Beef &
Sheep
Pork &
Chicken
Dairy
WEurope 0.69 0.96 0.95 0.68 0.88 0.65 0.94 0.99 1.02
Russia 0.58 1.10 0.99 0.99 0.69 0.08 0.93 0.75 0.94
CentralAsia 0.90 1.06 1.03 0.93 0.51 3.15 1.00 0.94 0.97
RestEEurope 0.79 0.96 1.05 0.87 1.02 0.92 1.00 0.88 1.03
USA 1.29 8.72 1.42 1.64 0.95 2.59 0.97 1.03 0.99
Canada 0.27 2.75 1.17 2.21 0.87 0.84 1.12 1.17 0.96
Australia 1.14 n.a. 3.62 8.71 1.31 2.43 1.66 1.12 1.16
NewZealand 0.23 0.73 0.95 0.71 1.01 0.94 1.73 1.54 1.73
Japan 0.96 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.84 0.56 0.83 0.66 0.95
China 1.00 0.84 1.01 0.47 0.95 0.64 0.89 1.01 0.97
Singapore 0.60 0.20 0.61 0.23 0.57 0.58 0.46 0.20 0.59
Indonesia 0.99 0.01 0.96 0.91 0.76 0.05 0.93 1.02 0.78
Malaysia 0.68 0.02 0.05 0.34 0.69 0.40 0.19 1.08 0.35
Philippines 0.93 0.34 0.96 0.75 1.06 0.63 0.83 0.99 0.60
Thailand 1.38 0.01 1.25 0.34 1.55 0.18 0.94 1.07 0.72
Vietnam 1.20 0.01 0.90 1.47 0.97 0.12 0.98 0.99 0.64
RestSEAsia 1.00 0.03 1.31 1.31 0.89 0.79 0.98 0.99 0.25
PacificIslan 0.03 0.35 0.46 6.58 1.35 1.52 0.81 0.56 0.93
HongKong 0.04 0.57 0.26 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.38 0.46 0.67
SouthKorea 0.95 0.02 0.11 0.17 0.70 0.11 0.75 0.86 0.92
Taiwan 0.90 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.58 0.10 0.78 0.93 0.72
RestNEAsia 0.82 0.45 0.61 0.29 0.53 0.85 0.95 0.85 0.75
India 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.01 0.98 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00
Pakistan 1.32 0.87 0.85 0.58 1.02 0.80 0.99 1.00 1.00
Bangladesh 0.98 0.63 0.36 0.71 0.86 0.68 1.00 0.95 0.74
RestSthAsia 0.96 0.33 0.60 0.99 0.66 1.18 0.97 0.90 0.71
Mexico 0.39 0.45 0.86 0.03 0.98 0.73 0.90 0.91 0.97
Argentina 1.40 3.34 1.97 1.24 1.18 0.82 1.16 1.22 1.16
Brazil 0.94 0.59 1.22 1.66 1.42 1.25 1.12 1.46 1.00
RestLAmerica 0.89 0.59 0.81 1.11 1.11 0.91 1.01 0.99 0.95
ME_NthAfrica 0.68 0.70 0.62 0.60 0.71 1.06 0.85 0.97 0.89
SouthAfrica 0.18 0.62 1.09 0.82 1.02 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.02
RestSSAfrica 0.59 0.32 0.98 1.24 0.93 2.36 1.03 0.94 0.60
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Table 2 (continued): Self-sufficiency ratio for various agricultural products, 2004 base, 2030
core, and 2030 under alternative TFP growth and farm trade policy scenarios
(b) 2030 core sim
Rice Wheat Coarse
Grains
Oilseeds Sugar Cotton Beef &
Sheep
Pork &
Chicken
Dairy
WEurope 0.98 1.33 1.00 0.83 0.90 1.90 0.95 1.21 1.03
Russia 0.50 1.13 1.00 0.96 0.57 0.27 0.92 0.74 0.89
CentralAsia 1.28 1.09 1.03 0.90 0.56 4.72 1.00 0.86 0.95
RestEEurope 0.90 1.03 1.09 0.81 1.08 1.20 0.99 0.80 1.06
USA 1.67 12.02 1.46 2.29 0.94 7.30 1.00 1.29 1.00
Canada 0.22 3.67 1.48 2.70 0.80 1.08 1.21 1.38 0.96
Australia 1.32 n.a. 5.15 9.40 1.31 3.68 1.62 1.57 1.09
NewZealand 0.28 0.82 0.97 1.08 1.01 2.03 1.89 3.14 1.69
Japan 0.97 0.19 0.03 0.11 0.85 0.78 0.86 0.65 0.94
China 0.98 0.60 0.96 0.19 0.84 0.48 0.63 0.79 0.93
Singapore 0.99 0.13 0.50 0.20 0.64 0.96 1.27 0.28 1.05
Indonesia 0.96 0.00 0.94 0.75 0.68 0.02 0.76 0.96 0.67
Malaysia 0.68 0.01 0.06 0.29 0.48 0.27 0.19 0.91 0.27
Philippines 0.82 0.11 0.92 0.45 0.95 0.26 0.69 0.91 0.76
Thailand 1.21 0.00 1.01 0.27 1.72 0.10 0.96 0.97 0.72
Vietnam 1.20 0.00 0.89 1.34 0.96 0.06 0.89 0.80 0.61
RestSEAsia 0.98 0.02 1.20 1.06 0.92 0.53 0.78 0.93 0.28
PacificIslan 0.04 0.33 0.45 7.83 1.27 2.87 0.78 0.63 0.83
HongKong 0.06 0.60 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.39 0.78
SouthKorea 0.94 0.02 0.10 0.19 0.93 0.13 0.74 0.88 0.91
Taiwan 0.95 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.58 0.16 0.86 1.04 0.75
RestNEAsia 0.79 0.35 0.63 0.20 0.42 0.89 0.64 0.68 0.68
India 1.09 1.13 1.07 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.99 0.97 1.02
Pakistan 1.44 0.60 0.74 0.26 1.05 0.44 0.95 0.92 0.99
Bangladesh 1.00 0.65 0.34 0.72 0.86 0.64 0.99 0.91 0.75
RestSthAsia 0.98 0.31 0.62 0.94 0.61 1.21 0.96 0.85 0.75
Mexico 0.50 0.56 0.87 0.09 1.06 1.32 1.01 0.98 0.97
Argentina 1.21 2.80 1.69 1.23 1.23 0.88 1.08 1.17 1.15
Brazil 0.99 0.57 1.10 1.99 1.50 2.08 1.45 1.99 1.17
RestLAmerica 0.89 0.58 0.80 1.14 1.13 1.40 0.96 0.97 0.92
ME_NthAfrica 0.72 0.70 0.58 0.55 0.77 1.33 0.89 1.10 0.94
SouthAfrica 0.29 0.95 1.43 1.00 1.19 2.13 1.06 1.04 1.11
RestSSAfrica 0.53 0.24 0.96 1.03 0.75 1.67 0.92 0.86 0.53
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Table 2 (continued): Self-sufficiency ratio for various agricultural products, 2004 base, 2030
core, and 2030 under alternative TFP growth and farm trade policy scenarios
(c) 2030 Higher grain TFP growth in ASEAN, China and India
Rice Wheat Coarse
Grains
Oilseeds Sugar Cotton Beef &
Sheep
Pork &
Chicken
Dairy
WEurope 0.88 1.27 1.00 0.83 0.89 1.93 0.94 1.21 1.03
Russia 0.47 1.11 1.00 0.96 0.57 0.27 0.92 0.74 0.89
CentralAsia 1.17 1.07 1.03 0.90 0.56 4.70 1.00 0.86 0.95
RestEEurope 0.86 1.00 1.09 0.81 1.08 1.20 0.99 0.80 1.06
USA 1.45 11.53 1.45 2.30 0.94 7.34 1.00 1.28 1.00
Canada 0.20 3.56 1.41 2.77 0.80 1.08 1.21 1.38 0.96
Australia 1.19 n.a. 4.81 9.53 1.31 3.74 1.63 1.56 1.09
NewZealand 0.25 0.80 0.97 1.08 1.01 2.03 1.89 3.09 1.69
Japan 0.97 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.85 0.77 0.86 0.65 0.94
China 0.98 0.65 0.96 0.19 0.85 0.48 0.64 0.79 0.93
Singapore 0.73 0.16 0.57 0.22 0.64 1.02 1.24 0.28 1.04
Indonesia 0.99 0.00 0.95 0.75 0.68 0.02 0.77 0.96 0.68
Malaysia 0.73 0.01 0.06 0.29 0.49 0.27 0.19 0.92 0.27
Philippines 0.89 0.15 0.93 0.45 0.95 0.26 0.69 0.91 0.76
Thailand 1.29 0.00 1.06 0.27 1.70 0.10 0.96 0.98 0.74
Vietnam 1.21 0.00 0.92 1.34 0.96 0.06 0.89 0.81 0.61
RestSEAsia 1.00 0.03 1.33 1.07 0.92 0.54 0.79 0.94 0.28
PacificIslan 0.03 0.32 0.45 7.84 1.27 2.86 0.78 0.63 0.83
HongKong 0.05 0.57 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.39 0.77
SouthKorea 0.93 0.02 0.10 0.19 0.93 0.13 0.74 0.88 0.91
Taiwan 0.91 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.58 0.16 0.86 1.04 0.75
RestNEAsia 0.74 0.35 0.63 0.20 0.43 0.89 0.64 0.69 0.68
India 1.11 1.22 1.08 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.99 0.97 1.02
Pakistan 1.36 0.59 0.74 0.26 1.05 0.44 0.95 0.92 0.99
Bangladesh 0.99 0.60 0.32 0.72 0.86 0.64 0.99 0.91 0.75
RestSthAsia 0.96 0.28 0.60 0.93 0.61 1.22 0.96 0.86 0.76
Mexico 0.48 0.54 0.87 0.09 1.06 1.31 1.01 0.98 0.98
Argentina 1.20 2.72 1.65 1.24 1.23 0.88 1.08 1.17 1.15
Brazil 0.98 0.56 1.09 1.99 1.50 2.09 1.45 1.99 1.17
RestLAmerica 0.87 0.56 0.80 1.13 1.13 1.40 0.96 0.97 0.92
ME_NthAfrica 0.67 0.69 0.58 0.55 0.77 1.33 0.89 1.10 0.94
SouthAfrica 0.29 0.88 1.42 1.00 1.19 2.11 1.06 1.04 1.10
RestSSAfrica 0.47 0.23 0.96 1.03 0.75 1.67 0.92 0.86 0.53
37
Table 2 (continued): Self-sufficiency ratio for various agricultural products, 2004 base, 2030
core, and 2030 under alternative TFP growth and farm trade policy scenarios
(d) 2030 with higher developing country agricultural protection
Rice Wheat Coarse
Grains
Oilseeds Sugar Cotton Beef &
Sheep
Pork &
Chicken
Dairy
WEurope 0.97 1.22 1.04 0.81 0.86 2.01 0.92 1.21 1.02
Russia 0.49 1.05 0.99 0.95 0.57 0.30 0.92 0.71 0.89
CentralAsia 1.25 1.04 1.02 0.96 0.45 4.30 1.00 0.87 0.99
RestEEurope 0.87 0.98 1.01 0.79 1.06 1.17 0.98 0.79 1.06
USA 1.26 10.25 1.33 2.29 0.94 7.56 0.99 1.25 0.99
Canada 0.21 3.40 1.27 2.80 0.80 1.08 1.14 1.38 0.96
Australia 1.20 n.a. 3.54 10.24 1.20 4.21 1.50 1.33 1.08
NewZealand 0.50 0.80 0.97 1.14 1.00 2.23 1.63 4.00 1.66
Japan 0.96 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.85 0.76 0.85 0.66 0.94
China 0.99 0.71 0.97 0.18 0.99 0.50 0.71 0.81 0.94
Singapore 0.87 0.09 0.37 0.16 0.57 1.02 0.85 0.27 0.92
Indonesia 1.00 0.00 0.94 0.81 0.85 0.02 0.80 0.95 0.62
Malaysia 0.91 0.00 0.06 0.28 0.43 0.23 0.17 0.89 0.17
Philippines 0.98 0.09 0.90 0.41 1.00 0.23 0.81 0.93 0.72
Thailand 1.11 0.00 1.00 0.27 1.45 0.10 1.00 0.97 0.81
Vietnam 1.14 0.00 0.88 1.22 1.00 0.06 0.93 0.90 0.79
RestSEAsia 1.00 0.01 1.16 1.03 1.00 0.53 0.87 0.95 0.34
PacificIslan 0.05 0.36 0.45 6.96 1.19 2.38 0.78 0.73 0.87
HongKong 0.05 0.58 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.39 0.77
SouthKorea 0.93 0.02 0.10 0.31 0.65 0.13 0.77 0.94 0.98
Taiwan 0.89 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.64 0.15 0.93 1.03 0.85
RestNEAsia 0.93 0.34 0.64 0.21 0.81 0.84 0.70 0.73 0.76
India 1.02 1.08 1.06 1.00 0.98 0.93 1.00 0.98 1.02
Pakistan 1.25 0.72 0.80 0.27 1.02 0.43 0.95 0.92 0.99
Bangladesh 1.00 0.62 0.33 0.70 0.99 0.62 1.00 0.94 0.74
RestSthAsia 1.00 0.35 0.62 0.96 0.89 1.18 0.96 0.84 0.77
Mexico 0.53 0.63 0.98 0.08 1.06 1.20 1.05 1.00 0.98
Argentina 1.07 2.83 1.48 1.20 1.13 0.89 1.07 1.10 1.10
Brazil 0.99 0.64 1.06 1.97 1.25 2.12 1.50 1.86 1.16
RestLAmerica 0.95 0.77 0.84 1.03 1.06 1.30 1.01 1.00 0.95
ME_NthAfrica 0.81 0.75 0.63 0.59 0.96 1.20 0.84 1.03 0.96
SouthAfrica 0.10 0.92 1.29 0.90 1.39 2.24 1.02 0.99 1.01
RestSSAfrica 0.78 0.28 0.97 1.02 0.87 1.40 0.94 0.90 0.68
Source: Derived from GTAP Model results summarized in Anderson and Strutt (2012b).
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Table 3: Changes in real household consumption per capita of agricultural and food products
from 2004 base in 2030 core and 2030 alternative TFP growth and farm trade policy
scenarios
(percent)
Core
Base
line
Lower
primary
TFP growth
Higher
ACI grain
TFP growth
Increased
agric.
protection
WEurope 33 25 33 33
Russia 99 105 99 99
RestEEurope 61 39 61 61
USA 41 28 41 41
Canada 48 43 49 49
Australia 64 60 64 64
NewZealand 62 49 62 62
Japan 31 23 31 31
China 226 160 228 226
Singapore 69 40 69 66
Indonesia 113 78 115 112
Malaysia 109 92 110 108
Philippines 143 88 145 142
Thailand 83 38 84 83
Vietnam 251 265 253 251
RestSEAsia 103 86 106 103
PacificIslan 61 69 61 60
HongKong 67 50 68 67
SouthKorea 67 47 67 66
Taiwan 75 56 76 74
RestNEAsia 105 84 105 103
India 177 131 178 177
Pakistan 212 144 212 212
Bangladesh 141 101 141 140
RestSthAsia 130 100 130 130
Central Asia 132 141 132 131
Latin America 79 67 79 79
M.E. & Africa 108 85 108 107
High-income 40 31 40 40
Developing 141 107 142 141
of which Asia: 168 123 169 168
Total 67 48 67 66
Source: Derived from GTAP Model results summarized in Anderson and Strutt (2012b).
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Table 4: Changes in real household consumption per capita of agricultural and food products
from core 2030 scenario due to trade policy reforms
(percent)
Trade reform scenarios
ASEAN+6
preferential
ASEAN+6
MFN
Full lib’n
from higher
ag prot’n
WEurope 0.0 0.1 4.4
Russia 0.3 0.3 4.0
RestEEurope -0.1 -0.2 0.6
USA 0.0 0.0 0.0
Canada 0.1 0.1 4.9
Australia 0.1 -0.1 -0.2
NewZealand 1.9 1.2 2.9
Japan 3.6 5.5 5.5
China 0.2 0.9 2.1
Singapore 2.6 3.0 6.5
Indonesia 0.7 0.8 1.6
Malaysia 3.5 15.4 17.3
Philippines 0.8 1.8 3.4
Thailand 3.8 5.2 5.7
Vietnam 2.7 4.9 5.3
RestSEAsia 1.1 2.5 3.2
PacificIslan -0.8 0.2 7.0
HongKong -0.3 2.8 3.0
SouthKorea 7.2 8.7 10.0
Taiwan -0.9 1.1 8.5
RestNEAsia -0.1 1.2 5.4
India 0.4 1.3 1.4
Pakistan -0.4 -0.2 1.6
Bangladesh -0.1 0.2 0.9
RestSthAsia -0.5 0.2 2.3
Central Asia 0.2 0.6 2.7
Latin America 0.1 0.0 0.6
M.E. & Africa 0.1 0.6 3.3
High-income 0.5 0.8 3.0
Developing 0.5 1.1 2.6
of which Asia: 0.7 1.6 2.7
Total 0.5 1.0 2.8
Source: Derived from GTAP Model results summarized in Anderson and Strutt (2012b).
Table 5: Short-run (one-year) price transmission elasticities,a key foodcrop products, Asian
developing countries, 1985 to 2010
Rice Wheat Maize Soybean Sugar Unweighted
average for
these crops
Bangladesh 0.42 0.26 0.04 0.24
China 0.56 0.55 0.47 0.66 0.83 0.61
India 0.44 0.43 0.53 1.00 0.08 0.50
Indonesia 0.58 0.71 0.55 0.46 0.58
Pakistan 0.20 0.29 0.12 0.14 0.19
Philippines 0.32 0.22 0.25 0.26
Sri Lanka 0.29 0.29
Thailand 1.00 0.79 0.14 0.75 0.67
Vietnam 0.57 0.28 0.43
Global average 0.51 0.58 0.63 0.73 0.43 0.58
a The proportion of a change in the international price that is transmitted to the domestic
market of a country within a year, as reflected in the producer price.
Source: Nelgen (2012, Appendix B), drawing on NRA estimates from Anderson and Nelgen
(2013).
2Table 6: Index of relative domestic food price stability,a Asian developing countries, selected
products, 1985 to 2010
(per cent)
Rice Wheat Maize Soybean Sugar
Av. of all
covered
productsb
Bangladesh 130 88 60 117
China 94 130 120 101 96 94
India 57 74 118 126 67 99
Indonesia 78 97 97 74 98
Malaysia 107 98
Pakistan 44 64 102 66 72
Philippines 71 67 65 88
Sri Lanka 109 111
Thailand 94 81 50 108 98
Unweighted
average 87 89 98 94 77 97
a Ratio of the coefficient of variation of the domestic producer price to the coefficient of
variation of the corresponding border price. Both prices are deflated by the United States’
GDP deflator and deviations are measured around log-linear trends and expressed as a
percentage.
b Weighted by the value of production at undistorted prices for the above 5 products plus on
average six other key products in each country.
Source: Nelgen (2012, Appendix C), drawing on NRA estimates from Anderson and Nelgen
(2013).
3Table 7: Contributionsa of importing and exporting countries to the proportion of the
international price change that is due to policy-induced trade barrier changes, 1972-74 and
2006-08
1972-74
TOTAL
PROPORTIONAL
CONTRIBUTION
Importing
countries’
contribution
Exporting
countries’
contribution
Rice 0.27 0.10 0.17
Wheat 0.23 0.18 0.05
Maize 0.18 0.06 0.12
2006-08
Rice 0.40 0.18 0.22
Wheat 0.19 0.07 0.12
Maize 0.10 0.03 0.07
a Expressed such that the two numbers in the right-hand pair of columns add to add to the
total proportion shown in column 1 of each row.
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2012) based on the methodology in Martin and Anderson
(2012) and the data in Anderson and Nelgen (2013).
4Table 8: Comparison of the domestic price rise with the rise in international grain prices net
of the contribution of changed trade restrictions, rice, wheat and maize, 1972-74 and 2006-08
(percent, unweighted averages)
International price rise Domestic price rises
including
contribution of
changed trade
restrictions
net of
contribution
of changed
trade
restrictions
All
countries
Developing
countries
High-income
countries
1972-74
Rice
300 220 59 72 27
Wheat
157 121 64 77 55
Maize
135 111 49 48 52
2006-08
Rice
113 68 56 48 74
Wheat 70 56 77 65 81
Maize 83 75 73 62 82
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2012), drawing on price data in Anderson and Nelgen (2013)
and, for column 2, the methodology in Martin and Anderson (2012).
5Table 9: Regional shares of global consumption of grains, 2004 and 2030 core projection
(percent)
2004 2030
Latin America 8.4 6.9
Africa and Middle East 12.9 15.0
Japan 11.7 5.0
Other High-income countries 21.9 14.8
Developing Asia: 45.0 58.4
China 12.0 27.1
ASEAN 9.3 10.5
India 13.2 12.2
Rest of South Asia 5.3 4.8
Other Asia 5.2 3.8
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
Source: Derived from GTAP Model results of Anderson and Strutt (2012b)
Appendix Table A.1: Average annual GDP and endowment growth rates, 2004 to 2030
GDP
growth
Population
growth
Unskilled
labor
Skilled
labor
Produced
capital
Agric.
land
Oil Gas Coal Other
minerals
W. Europe 1.48 0.14 -1.09 1.50 1.60 -0.28 2.81 0.77 -2.51 2.07
E. Europe 3.51 0.02 -0.57 1.49 4.03 -0.23 2.64 0.12 -1.86 2.07
US & Canada 2.09 0.82 0.17 1.59 1.75 -0.20 1.00 -0.14 0.19 2.07
Australia & NZ 2.78 1.07 0.31 1.89 1.59 -0.56 1.49 6.10 3.55 2.07
Japan 0.92 -0.21 -1.45 0.98 0.40 -1.14 0.00 0.00 -9.34 2.07
China 8.05 0.29 0.03 2.88 7.62 -0.36 -0.40 4.85 5.62 2.07
ASEAN 5.25 0.97 0.45 3.67 5.95 0.17 1.31 1.48 11.71 2.07
Pacific Islands 3.66 1.72 2.30 1.88 3.86 0.19 1.54 1.21 0.15 2.07
Rest E. Asia 3.47 0.31 -0.45 2.20 3.11 -0.87 0.00 0.00 -1.59 2.07
India 7.88 1.18 1.37 4.03 7.27 -0.04 0.24 0.00 4.93 2.07
Rest S. Asia 7.23 1.36 1.99 4.93 8.14 -0.10 0.27 -2.18 2.26 2.07
Central Asia 4.09 -0.46 -0.67 1.07 4.38 -0.29 2.81 0.77 -2.51 2.07
Latin America 3.81 0.92 0.78 3.32 4.85 0.22 3.29 -0.34 5.15 2.07
ME & Africa 4.55 1.92 1.04 4.16 5.46 0.05 1.27 3.64 1.89 2.07
High-income 1.73 0.27 -0.55 1.49 1.56 -0.33 2.07 0.40 -0.26 2.07
Developing 5.28 1.03 0.52 3.28 5.81 -0.09 1.48 2.24 5.57 2.07
of which Asia: 6.24 0.78 0.26 2.93 6.26 -0.16 0.72 0.93 5.93 2.07
Total 2.45 0.88 -0.37 1.68 2.65 -0.17 1.67 1.23 2.50 2.07
Source: From Anderson and Strutt (2012b)
7Appendix Table A.2: Cumulative changes in international prices, 2004 to 2030
(price relative to global average output price change across all sectors, percent)
Core
2030
sim
2030
slower
prim.
TFP
2030
higher
ACI
grain
TFP
ASEAN+
6,
pref.
lib’n
ASEAN
+6,
MFN
lib’n
Full global
lib’n from
higher agric
protection
Rice 9.7 22.1 4.0 -0.8 -3.2 -4.5
Wheat 14.6 48.4 11.5 -1.1 5.7 3.0
Coarse Grains 22.0 61.3 17.7 -0.6 1.5 1.3
Fruit & Veg. 40.8 85.8 38.6 -0.9 -4.5 -6.8
Oilseeds 21.4 63.9 20.4 -2.1 -2.4 1.5
Sugar -2.0 5.3 -2.2 -1.2 -3.5 -4.6
Cotton 30.5 67.6 29.2 -2.0 -2.3 4.1
Other Crops 12.8 48.9 11.9 -1.2 -2.0 -1.8
Beef & Sheep 1.7 13.3 1.4 -0.4 -0.5 -1.0
Pork & Chicken 12.7 24.6 11.5 -0.7 -2.5 -4.8
Dairy -2.1 8.0 -2.2 -0.8 -0.3 0.2
Other Food 4.3 12.4 4.0 -0.7 -1.8 -2.9
All agric. & food 8.9 24.5 8.0 -0.8 -1.7 -2.6
Other primary 24.7 100.6 24.7 0.3 0.9 0.4
Manufactures -0.2 0.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.4
Services -1.8 -7.0 -1.8 0.1 0.4 0.5
Source: Derived from a revision and expansion of GTAP Model results in Anderson and
Strutt (2012b).
8Appendix Table A.3: Regional shares of world real GDP and population, and GDP per
capita relative to world average, 2004 and the core projection for 2030a
World GDP share World population share GDP per capita relative
to world average
2004 2030 2004 2030 2004 2030
W. Europe 33.0 22.7 7.8 6.4 422.7 357.9
Russia 1.4 1.7 2.2 1.6 61.9 101.2
Rest E. Europe 1.1 1.3 2.4 2.1 47.3 61.5
USA 28.5 22.9 4.6 4.5 617.7 512.0
Canada 2.4 2.0 0.5 0.5 478.9 410.3
Australia 1.6 1.5 0.3 0.3 500.0 460.3
New Zealand 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 377.9 358.3
Japan 11.4 6.8 2.0 1.5 569.3 457.8
China 4.1 14.4 20.4 17.3 20.0 83.3
Singapore 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 391.0 426.7
Indonesia 0.6 1.2 3.4 3.4 18.1 36.0
Malaysia 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 72.2 113.4
Philippines 0.2 0.5 1.3 1.5 16.2 33.1
Thailand 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.9 39.7 68.8
Vietnam 0.1 0.3 1.3 1.3 8.1 24.4
Rest SE Asia 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.1 4.6 7.6
Pacific Islands 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 38.2 37.4
Hong Kong 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 366.1 393.4
South Korea 1.7 1.8 0.7 0.6 222.0 296.3
Taipei,China 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.3 209.7 315.5
Rest NE Asia 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 15.8 26.6
India 1.6 5.3 17.0 18.1 9.2 29.3
Pakistan 0.2 0.7 2.4 2.9 9.6 24.6
Bangladesh 0.1 0.4 2.2 2.3 6.3 18.0
Rest South Asia 0.1 0.2 1.2 1.3 6.9 14.4
Central Asia 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.8 17.8 34.0
Mexico 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 101.0 100.8
Argentina 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 61.3 117.1
Brazil 1.5 2.3 2.9 2.7 52.4 83.9
Rest L. America 1.7 2.1 3.5 3.7 49.6 56.9
M.E. & N Africa 2.7 3.7 5.3 6.0 51.5 61.7
South Africa 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 70.8 92.1
Rest SS Africa 0.8 1.8 10.7 15.0 7.1 12.3
High-income 79.6 59.0 20.0 16.9 398.7 349.9
Developing 20.4 41.0 80.0 83.1 25.5 49.3
of which Asia: 11.1 28.1 54.6 52.8 20.4 53.2
World 100 100 100 100 100 100
a 2004 prices.
Source: Derived from a revision and expansion of GTAP Model results in Anderson and
Strutt (2012b).
